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THE BIG SQUEEZE 
INTRODUCTION 
The Mammography Story 
The story cried out to be told. It cried out in the passion of the true believers, apologists for a beleaguered test. It cried out in the polemics of the skeptics, emphasizing possible risks 
and advising caution. It cried out in the posturing of political lead-
ers who co-opted a scientific debate to satisfy the expediency of the 
moment. It cried out in the gratitude and calm resignation of those 
for whom mammography worked. And it cried out in the silent 
pain and anguish of those who did "everything right," yet for whom 
mammography failed. 
Over the years, our national conversation on mammography has 
often resembled the ancient Indian parable of the blind men and the 
elephant. In this tale, each man feels just one of the animal's body 
parts and tries to describe the essence of the beast. Thus, one feels 
the elephant's sturdy leg and declares, "The elephant is much like 
a pillar." Another feels its thin tail and concludes, "The elephant is 
much like a rope," and so on. This book attempts to take a step back, 
remove the blinders, and tell the whole story. 
From the beginning, mammography has been promoted as a 
silver bullet in the fight against breast cancer, the most important 
THE BIG SQUEEZE 
thing a woman can do to "protect" herself from the dreaded dis-
ease. This "mammogram protector" metaphor has been a domi-
nant theme in public education campaigns throughout the history 
of the test. It has been very successful in establishing a culture of 
screening. Yet this simplistic rendition of a complex issue has also 
had many undesirable effects. Most important, it has contributed to 
a pervasive misunderstanding of what mammography is and what 
it does. Many women overestimate mammography's capabilities; 
others confuse screening with prevention. Thus, not surprisingly, anger 
and confusion are common responses when a woman is diagnosed 
with breast cancer despite faithfully undergoing annual testing. 
Mammography has been mired in controversy since its earliest 
days. The question whether women under fifty should be screened 
first became a contentious debate in 1976, only three years after its 
nationwide debut. This dispute has dogged mammography through-
out its existence, becoming more acrimonious with each eruption. 
There are two reasons for this. The first is that the debate has never 
been entirely about science. In this book I show that major stake-
holders in this debate—namely, the American Cancer Society and 
the American College of Radiology—adopted a "pro" position on 
this question, long before there was any scientific basis for it. In the 
ensuing decades, it has become clear that the science supporting 
screening is much more robust for women over fifty (postmeno-
pausal) than for younger women. Thus, in most of the developed 
world, public health policy calls for screening to begin at age fifty. In 
the United States, the backers of under-fifty screening succeeded by 
convincing political leaders that it was expedient to be on the "right" 
side of this issue. In taking that position, they would demonstrate 
appropriate sensitivity to women's health issues. As this occurred, 
the nexus of the debate moved from the realm of science to politics. 
Here it has resided, at least since the mid-1990s. The second reason 
why the screening of women younger than fifty is mammography's 
perennial dispute is that both parties in this argument claim to have 
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science on their side. Because there is some scientific justification 
for both positions, each side has taken to denouncing studies that 
conflict with its view and highlighting those that support it. Thus, 
over time, positions have become more rigid and uncompromising. 
Now more than ever, women deserve an open and frank dis-
cussion of mammography, its benefits, and its potential risks. Not 
only does the controversy regarding under-fifty screening continue 
unabated, but also there is a growing body of research that questions 
whether decades of screening mammography has accomplished any-
thing at all. These studies suggest that the observed reduction in the 
death rate from breast cancer is due to improvements in treatment 
rather than early detection. As we approach the fortieth anniversary 
of the start of widespread screening mammography in the United 
States, it is a fitting time to pause and reflect. 
The Big Squeeze: A Social and Political History of the Controver-
sial Mammogram chronicles the often turbulent history of screening 
mammography since its introduction in the early 1970s. This book 
makes five key points. First, it shows how pivotal decisions during 
mammography's initial roll-out made it all but inevitable that the 
test would never be far from controversy. Second, it describes how, 
at several key points in its history, the establishment of a culture 
of mammography screening was greatly aided by concurrent social 
and political forces and movements. Third, it illustrates how politics 
came to dominate the debate, eventually achieving primacy over sci-
ence itself. Fourth, The Big Squeeze describes the collateral economy 
that developed around screening. As mammography was aggres-
sively promoted in the late 1980s to early 1990s, utilization rates 
rapidly increased. As this occurred, the mundane mammogram be-
came the little pink engine that could, and did, drive the growth 
of a vast screening-dependent secondary economy. Finally, mam-
mography's burden, overdiagnosis, is considered in the last chap-
ter. Overdiagnosis, the screening detection of cancers that would 
never otherwise have come to light in the individual's lifetime, is an 
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important yet woefully underdiscussed risk of mammography. This 
phenomenon is more significant than that, however. Overdiagnosis 
helped make fighting breast cancer the most favored disease cause 
and mammography the most favored weapon in the fight. 
The story of mammography fascinates me for several reasons. 
First, no other medical test even comes close in the degree of pas-
sion and controversy it evokes. Between the true believers and the 
skeptics, the mammography debates of the past four decades have 
showcased the full range of human emotion. Second, no medical 
test has been so completely "adopted" by political leaders eager to 
demonstrate their sensitivity to women's issues. They have not sim-
ply appropriated the debate, however; they have largely converted it 
from a scientific to a political one. Finally, and this may be the most 
fascinating point of all, the central argument in the disputes over 
mammography—namely, whether or not women under fifty should 
be screened—hasn't changed in the entire forty-year history of the 
test. As a radiologist, I have witnessed the unfolding of this compel-
ling history firsthand. Through The Big Squeeze, I wish to share it 
with you. 
First, though, a word about definitions. Throughout this book 
the term "mammography" should be understood to mean "screen-
ing mammography." This is a test that is performed on women 
without breast-related symptoms or complaints, to search for unsus-
pected breast cancer. In the United States it is typically performed 
at one- to two-year intervals on women, starting at age forty. This is 
the subject of the book. There will be occasional references to "di-
agnostic mammography." This is mammography used to evaluate a 
specific problem the patient may have, such as breast pain or a lump. 
This test is done on an as-needed basis. It is not a central part of this 
discussion. 
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TIMING IS EVERYTHING 
Screening mammography burst onto the stage of national consciousness in 1973. When it did, it found an audience primed to receive it. Political, social, and health movements 
that had been occurring in the larger American society underwent 
a remarkable convergence in the late 1960s to mid-1970s. This was 
precisely the time when the results of the earliest medical research 
on mammography were becoming widely known. Though it is likely 
that this new screening test would have been successful on its own, 
this fortuitous alignment of external forces helped ensure that pub-
lic acceptance would be rapid and durable. In this chapter I examine 
the three principal movements that set the stage for screening mam-
mography's auspicious debut. In its subsequent history, newer incar-
nations of these same forces would surface repeatedly, particularly at 
times of great controversy. 
Cancer Fighting as Good Politics 
On March 25, 1970, Senator Ralph Yarborough, a Texas Demo-
crat, made an impassioned speech on the floor of the United States 
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Senate. In it he bemoaned the lack of significant progress toward the 
eradication of cancer in the thirty-three years since the establishment 
of the National Cancer Institute (NCI). Yarborough, who had been 
in the Senate for thirteen years, was a progressive southern Demo-
crat who, as chairman of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee 
(now the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee), was a 
frequent and forceful voice on health issues. As he saw it, the cause 
of this stagnation was twofold. Primarily it was due to severe under-
resourcing of the effort. He pointed out that the approximately $200 
million per year being spent at the time on the government's anti-
cancer efforts was "far less than the $358 million we spend each year 
for chewing gum."1 The second was the lack of a clear national focus 
and determination to accomplish the goal. To Yarborough and like-
minded political leaders, the successes of the Manhattan Project and 
the Apollo program were apt case studies in what was possible when 
the nation was determined to spare no effort in order to achieve a 
seemingly impossible goal. Yarborough s conversations with leading 
cancer experts, notably Sidney Farber, a distinguished Boston on-
cologist and president of the American Cancer Society (ACS), led 
him to believe that a major breakthrough in cancer control was im-
minent. In fact, a few months earlier, at the November 1969 annual 
meeting of the ACS, Farber had urged a $2 billion a year effort, 
modeled after the space program, to achieve cancer control. "With-
out naming the day or year, such a conquest is a realistic goal," he 
is reported to have said at a press conference.2 Going much further, 
Yarborough and forty-six co-sponsors introduced a resolution call-
ing for the creation of a Committee of Consultants on the Conquest 
of Cancer. The committee was charged with recommending "to 
Congress and to the American people what must be done to achieve 
cures for the major forms of cancer by 1976—the 200th anniversary 
of the founding of this great Republic."3 The Yarborough resolution 
was adopted by the full Senate and resulted in the constitution of a 
twenty-six-member Committee of Consultants, co-chaired by Far-
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ber and Benno C. Schmidt, chairman of the board of the trustees of 
Memorial Hospital in New York.4 
Nineteen seventy would prove to be Yarborough's last full year 
in the Senate. In May of that year he was defeated in the Texas 
Democratic primary election by conservative businessman Lloyd 
Bentsen Jr. in a particularly bitter political contest.5 The Committee 
of Consultants presented part one of its report to the Senates Labor 
and Welfare Committee in the fall of 1970. Despite his recent elec-
toral trouncing, Yarborough, in the final days of his Senate service, 
introduced a major piece of health care legislation. The Conquest 
of Cancer Act, introduced in December 1970, incorporated most 
of the major recommendations of the advisory committee. Its pri-
mary provision was to call for the establishment of an independent 
cancer-fighting agency, the National Cancer Authority (modeled 
after the National Aeronautics and Space Administration), which 
would take over all the responsibilities of the NCI but would not be 
a part of the National Institutes of Health. 
At the White House the battle was about to be joined. President 
Richard M. Nixon, sensing that Congress had tapped into an issue 
likely to resonate with the American people, was not going to miss 
an opportunity to demonstrate presidential leadership. The public 
was becoming increasingly frustrated with the Vietnam War, and 
he was eager to change the subject of the national conversation. In 
his State of the Union message on January 22, 1971, he called for an 
extra $100 million appropriation to "launch an intensive campaign 
to find a cure for cancer." At no previous time in American history 
had cancer received this level of presidential attention. Nixon went 
on to declare: "The time has come in America when the same kind 
of concentrated effort that split the atom and took man to the moon 
should be turned toward conquering this dread disease. Let us make 
a total national commitment to achieve this goal."6 
Competing cancer-fighting bills were introduced and debated 
in Congress that year. A modified version of the Yarborough bill 
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was introduced by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, a Massachusetts 
Democrat, and a Nixon-backed bill was proposed by Senator Peter 
H. Dominick, a Colorado Republican. After a contentious yearlong 
legislative effort, the National Cancer Act of 1971 was signed into 
law on December 23. In his signing statement Nixon extended the 
now familiar military metaphor associated with the anticancer ef-
fort. Referring to new presidential powers granted by the act, he 
vowed that "the President will be able to take personal command of 
the Federal effort to conquer cancer."7 Not only would he be com-
mander in chief of a military battling an enemy in Southeast Asia, 
but also he would be personally leading the charge against an enemy 
much closer to home. It is in this regard that Nixon is commonly 
considered to have launched the nation's "War on Cancer," even 
though, as we have seen, the fight was well under way by the time he 
arrived on the battlefield. 
The National Cancer Act provided massive new federal fund-
ing for the country's anticancer effort ($1.6 billion in the first three 
years) and significantly elevated the status of the NCI. Of all its 
provisions, however, one in particular, the allocation of $90 million 
to fund cooperative cancer control programs with state or private 
agencies, would quickly prove pivotal in the establishment of mam-
mographic screening.8 
Feminism and Women's Health 
The women's health movement of the 1960s and 1970s constitutes 
the fourth wave of what the sociologist Carol Weisman describes as 
a larger "mega-movement" in women's health, a phenomenon that 
began with the women's health component of the popular health 
movement of the 1830s and 1840s and continued through the women's 
health political agenda of the early 1990s.9 Women of the baby 
boom generation entered the period of peak reproductive potential 
in the 1960s, and it was these women, primarily in their twenties 
8 
TIMING IS EVERYTHING 
and thirties, who were the leaders of this movement.10 Not surpris-
ingly, their primary concern was asserting control over their repro-
ductive functions. This movement, which was intertwined with the 
feminist movement of the same period, was motivated by a view-
point which held that women did not have ultimate control over 
their own bodies and their own health.11 As noted by Sheryl Ruzek, 
author of a detailed history of this movement, "from the Supreme 
Court to the examining room, men were making fateful decisions 
about women's bodies and their reproductive lives."12 Abortion was 
illegal in most states, and many had laws limiting the sale and dis-
tribution of contraceptives. To further its goal of reordering the bal-
ance of power between the male-dominated medical and political 
establishments and the masses of laywomen, the women's health 
movement employed two main strategies: self-help groups and polit-
ical action organizations.13 The Boston Women's Health Book Col-
lective, the most famous of the self-help groups, consisted of a group 
of laywomen who met regularly to commiserate about their feelings 
of "frustration, and anger toward . . . the medical [system and] . . . 
doctors who were condescending, paternalistic, judgmental and 
non-informative."14 The groundbreaking self-help women's health 
manual Our Bodies, Ourselves was published by this group in 1971. It 
presented detailed information, all of it obtained through the pains-
taking research of group members, on topics such as contraception, 
abortion, the female sexual response, and sexually transmitted dis-
ease, to an audience of women unaccustomed to frank treatment of 
such subjects. The self-help gynecology movement, begun in April 
1971 by the feminist Carol Downer, taught women how to perform 
a speculum examination on themselves or other women.15 Self-help 
groups in Chicago formed a network of facilities (known simply as 
"Jane") where laywomen provided safe (illegal) abortion services.16 
Freestanding birthing centers and the concept of "natural" child-
birth took root in various parts of the country as a response to what 
many women saw as the "medicalization" of childbirth.17 
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Important accomplishments of the women's health movement 
during this time include the Supreme Court decisions Griswold v. 
Connecticut (1965), which invalidated a Connecticut law that made 
it illegal for married couples to obtain or use contraceptives, and Roe 
v. Wade (1973), which invalidated a Texas law banning abortion, 
legalizing the procedure nationwide for the first time. 
According to Weisman, "the Women's Health Movement created 
a cohort of women concerned about matters of health and health 
care and a network of organizations to sustain this activism."18 
Although in the 1960s and 1970s the issue for these twenty- and 
thirty-year-old baby boomers was reproductive health, it was this 
same cohort of activist women, primed and ready for action, who 
would fight the mammography and breast cancer battles as forty-
and fifty-year-olds in the late 1980s and early 1990s.19 
Preaching the Gospel of Early Detection 
For most of the twentieth century, the principal theme of public 
discourse on breast cancer was early detection. This arose from the 
prevailing medical view of cancer as, initially, a local disease that, if 
treated early and aggressively, could be cured. As early as 1894, Wil-
liam Halsted, the renowned Johns Hopkins University surgeon who 
pioneered the radical mastectomy, wrote that "cancer of the breast is 
a curable disease if operated upon properly and in time."20 Whether 
by design or happenstance, Halsted's phrase "operated upon prop-
erly and in time" encapsulated the essence of the cancer education 
programs that would come to dominate the new century. The point 
was simply that surgery cures cancer, but only if the patient presents 
to the surgeon promptly. A May 1913 Ladies' Home Journal article 
titled "What Can We Do about Cancer?" put it bluntly: "No cancer 
is hopeless when discovered early. Most cancer, discovered early, is 
curable. The only cure is the knife. Medicines are worse than use-
less. Delay is more than dangerous; it is deadly. The one hope, and 
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a strong one, is prompt and radical operation; a half operation is 
worse than none at all."21 
Founded in 1913 by a group of surgeons, the American Soci-
ety for the Control of Cancer (ASCC) was warmly received and 
fully endorsed by the larger medical establishment. From its in-
ception, the dominant message of the ASCC was that surgeons 
could effectively treat (and cure) cancer in its earliest stages.22 
Early on, cancers specific to women received particular attention. 
To reach the female public more effectively, the male-dominated 
ASCC established an all-female wing, the Women's Field Army, 
in 1937. This organization, modeled after a military unit down to 
the military-style uniforms and insignia its members wore, became 
known as the "educational arm of the ASCC."23 At its peak, the 
Women's Field Army had 700,000 members, each having paid a 
one-time enrollment fee of one dollar.24 These large funds were 
used to finance a massive public education campaign consisting 
of mass meetings, lectures, radio broadcasts, and newspaper and 
magazine articles, as well as educational brochures. Women were 
the target audience, and the focus was breast and reproductive 
cancers.25 The overall message was threefold: that cancer could be 
cured, that early detection allowed successful treatment, and that 
regular medical checkups for women, even when they were feeling 
well, were essential.26 
In 1944 the ASCC underwent a major restructuring incited 
by a prominent New York philanthropist and health care activist, 
Mary Lasker. In addition to a change in the governance of the or-
ganization, the ASCC was rebranded the American Cancer Society. 
Shortly thereafter the Women's Field Army was integrated into the 
ACS and the organization adopted a new focus: securing funds for 
cancer research through charitable donations. Its initial fund-raising 
activities were wildly successful, and within its first year of existence 
the ACS became the largest nongovernmental funding agency for 
cancer research.27 
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Promoting early detection, however, remained a major focus of 
the ACS. In 1948 it produced, Life Saving Fingers, the first educa-
tional film on breast self-examination (BSE). In it, a woman, un-
dressed from the waist up, demonstrated the procedure. The film 
was narrated by Dr. Alfred Popma, a Boise, Idaho, radiologist who 
is credited with developing the first educational materials specifi-
cally describing the proper technique for BSE.28 It was widely dis-
tributed and shown to packed houses in major cinemas.29 
In addition to films, the postwar period saw continued dis-
semination of the early detection message in articles and advertise-
ments in the popular press, posters, and educational pamphlets. 
As noted by the historian Kirsten Gardner, many of these directly 
targeted women and used fictional characters who demonstrated 
"good/wise" or "bad/foolish" behavior by following or not follow-
ing ACS recommendations for early detection.30 A "wise" woman 
was one who noted a lump in her breast and quickly sought treat-
ment. She was portrayed as happy and healthy. A "foolish" woman 
ignored her lump, not seeking care until it was too late. She was por-
trayed as depressed and dying. Thus, observes Gardner, "women's 
behavior became the key variable in cancer control. . . . [I]f 
a woman with cancer failed to follow early detection principles, 
death seemed inevitable, and the victim assumed the blame."31 
There was little to no discussion of the difficulty and uncertainty 
inherent in examining breasts (limitations of early detection), the 
physical impact of radical mastectomy (the only treatment avail-
able at the time), or the possibility that death may still occur de-
spite "wise" behavior (treatment failure). While this single-minded 
focus on early detection may have been well intentioned, calculated 
to empower women and replace fear with hope, it had unintended 
consequences, some of which still echo faintly today in the guilt 
many women experience when a cancerous lump is found by their 
doctor or on a mammogram—guilt for having "failed" at BSE by 
not finding it first. 
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At this point it is helpful to digress briefly and consider another 
important female reproductive cancer. The American Cancer So-
ciety's efforts against cervical cancer would come to define its ap-
proach to screening mammography some decades later. 
In January 1928 George Papanicolaou, a Greek-born pathologist 
who had emigrated to the United States in 1913, presented some 
preliminary observations at the Third Race Betterment Confer-
ence in Battle Creek, Michigan.32 Papanicolaou, working at Cor-
nell Medical College,33 had obtained daily vaginal smears from a 
group of women and examined them microscopically for cellular 
aberrations. He showed that malignant cells and precancerous le-
sions could be detected with this simple technique. Papanicolaou's 
work aroused very little interest in the medical community for many 
years. Surgical orthodoxy at the time accepted open biopsy34 as the 
only reliable means of diagnosing cervical cancer. In the 1930s and 
1940s Papanicolaou's findings were reproduced by other researchers, 
yet there was limited adoption of the new technique. Major barriers 
to adopting the Pap test were lack of education among physicians 
and the lay public as well as absence of an infrastructure of profes-
sional cytotechnicians and pathologists trained in the technique. 
With these considerations in mind, an ambitious five-year cervi-
cal cancer screening program was launched in 1952. Dubbed the 
Memphis Project, it was jointly sponsored by the Cancer Control 
Branch of the NCI, the University of Tennessee, and the Memphis 
branch of the ACS. The goal of the project was to screen all 165,000 
women over the age of twenty in the Memphis-Shelby County, 
Tennessee, area annually for five years.35 The ACS and its army of 
volunteers played an important role in the public education compo-
nent of the project.36 During the course of the study, over 150,000 
women were screened, and a large number of early stage cervical 
cancers were diagnosed. Prior to the initiation of screening, 34 per-
cent of white and 18 percent of African American cervical cancer 
patients in the Memphis-Shelby County area were diagnosed in 
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stage 1. During the program, these rates increased to 57 percent and 
38 percent, respectively.37 
The success of the Memphis Project showed that the Pap smear 
could be efficiently applied to large populations, that early detection 
of cervical cancer was possible, and thus lives could be saved.38 In 
1953 the U.S. death rate from uterine cancer (including cancer of 
the cervix as well as the body of the uterus) was 16.8 per 100,000 
women. By 1963 the death rate had been reduced by a remarkable 
27 percent, to 12.2 per 100,000.39 This notable achievement was 
largely due to widespread adoption of the Pap smear in routine gy-
necologic care. The Pap smear represents the most dramatic valida-
tion of early detection in the history of medicine. These efforts were 
viewed as unmitigated triumphs of the principles long espoused by 
the ACS. The elixir of success strengthened its resolve and bolstered 
its confidence. 
Thus, by the time screening mammography was introduced to 
the public in the early 1970s, the notion of early detection for effec-
tive cancer control had been successfully inculcated in the American 
psyche. The new screening test promised to be more reliable than the 
patient's fingers and would lighten the burden that self-examination 
placed upon her. The ACS, hoping to reproduce its success against 
cervical cancer, would again play a leading role in the dissemination 
of a new screening technology. Add to this the new cancer-fighting 
political agenda in Washington, D.C., and the growing women's 
health care activism, and the stage was set for screening mammogra-
phy to have a successful opening act. 
14 
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In medicine, the introduction of new imaging technology is typically 
la three-phase process.1 In the first phase, diffusion occurs slowly 
las early adopters—academics and other "technology leaders"— 
perform much of the initial clinical research that defines the capa-
bility of the new device. If these results are favorable, then as they 
are disseminated in medical journals and professional conferences, 
there comes a point when a rapid increase in the adoption of the new 
technology is observed. This second phase is often aided by media 
attention, which in turn drives consumer interest. Finally, as market 
saturation is achieved, the rate of diffusion levels off. 
Mammography's path was not so orderly or predictable. In 1970 
the age-adjusted death rate from breast cancer in the United States 
stood at approximately 27 per 100,000 women, essentially unchanged 
since record keeping began in 1930.2 All the efforts of the first half of 
the twentieth century, promoting early detection and prompt radical 
surgery, had accomplished very little. When the American Cancer 
Society launched the massive Breast Cancer Detection Demonstra-
tion Project (BCDDP) in 1973, most Americans had never heard of 
mammography. Their first exposure would be a crash course. 
THE BIG SQUEEZE 
The BCDDP: A New Screening 
Regimen Emerges 
Mammography was not new in 1973. Like the Pap smear, it had lan-
guished through a prolonged season of indifference. Clinical mam-
mography (that is, on live patients) was first reported by Stafford 
Warren in 1930.3 In the 1930s and 1940s there were sporadic other 
reports of clinical mammography in the medical literature. These all 
described using X-ray to examine the breasts of patients who were 
already suspected of having breast cancer because of the presence of 
a lump or other symptoms. High-quality images were very difficult 
to obtain, however, and the technique was hard to reproduce outside 
select research institutions. Mammography never caught on. 
Interest in mammography was renewed as a result of two impor-
tant developments that occurred in 1960-61. In 1961, the radiologist 
Jacob Gershon-Cohen, of Albert Einstein Medical Center in Phila-
delphia, reported on his findings from mammography in healthy 
women (that is, with no physical signs or symptoms of breast cancer). 
In 1956 he had recruited 1,312 such women, who then underwent 
mammography and physical examination every six months for five 
years. During the course of the study, twenty-three cancers were 
discovered, six of which could not be palpated on physical ex-
amination but were identified solely on the basis of the mammo-
graphic findings.4 This study was significant for two important 
reasons: it was the first use of mammography as a screening tool 
(that is, to evaluate women who had no suspicion of breast cancer), 
and it was one of the first demonstrations that mammography could 
identify breast cancer that could not be felt by a surgeon. 
At about the same time that Gershon-Cohen was initiating his 
screening study in Philadelphia, another radiologist, Robert Egan, 
was completing his radiology training at M. D. Anderson Cancer 
Center in Houston. His department chairman had assigned him the 
task of solving the technical problems of mammography. By vary-
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ing the intensity and quantity of the radiation used, as well as ex-
perimenting with a variety of different X-ray film types, Egan's work 
produced the technical breakthrough that mammography needed. 
When he published his results in 1960, he described the technical 
factors required to produce high-quality mammograms reliably. 
Using his technique, one thousand mammograms were performed 
on women suspected of having breast cancer. Not only was he able 
to identify correctly 238 of 240 known malignant tumors, but also 
he identified 19 tumors in breasts that were thought to be normal on 
the basis of the surgeon's physical examination.5 
As an aside, it should be noted that at this stage in its history, 
mammography was performed with general purpose X-ray equip-
ment, such as might be used to X-ray a broken bone. Machines de-
signed specifically for mammography, such as we have today, were 
not introduced in the United States until 1967, when the French 
medical equipment manufacturer CGR unveiled the Senograph. By 
the early 1970s, there were multiple manufacturers selling similar 
dedicated mammography machines.6 The practice of using general 
purpose X-ray equipment for mammography did not completely 
disappear, however, until the late 1980s. 
In the mid-1960s, the U.S. Public Health Service undertook a 
study in which radiologists from twenty-four institutions around 
the country went to M. D. Anderson to learn the Egan technique 
and were then observed to see if they could reproduce it in their 
own institutions. The results showed that the technique was highly 
reproducible.7 
The momentum was building. In 1962 Dr. Philip Strax, director 
of radiology at City Hospital in New York, approached the lead-
ership of the Health Insurance Plan (HIP) of Greater New York, 
a private health insurance company, with the results of Gershon-
Cohen's and Egan's work.8 Strax, whose first wife, Bertha, had died 
of breast cancer at age thirty-nine, was very passionate about the 
disease. He had studied the Egan technique and had been offering 
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mammography as part of his practice. He felt strongly that the time 
had come for a large, carefully designed study of the effectiveness 
of mammography as a screening test for breast cancer. Coinciden-
tally, the National Cancer Institute was interested in funding such a 
study and was looking for a suitable site.9 
The HIP mammography trial began in 1963. It was directed by 
Strax; Sam Shapiro, an internist with the HIP research and statis-
tics department; and Louis Venet, a surgeon at New York Medical 
College. In this study, 62,000 women between the ages of forty 
and sixty-four were randomly assigned to one of two groups. The 
screening group received mammography and physical examina-
tion at enrollment and at three subsequent annual follow-up vis-
its. The mammography was a modification of the Egan technique. 
The control group received only the usual medical care, which at 
the time did not include routine mammography. The results, re-
ported in the Journal ofthe American Medical Association in March 
1971, were dramatic.10 After three and a half years of follow-up, 
there were 40 percent fewer breast cancer deaths among women 
aged fifty to fifty-nine who were in the screening group than 
among those in the control group. Furthermore, 70 percent of 
women who had their cancer diagnosed by screening had no dis-
ease in their lymph nodes, compared to 45 percent in the control 
group, indicating that screening caught the disease earlier, before 
it had spread. Finally, of the 127 confirmed breast cancers in the 
screening group, 42 (33 percent) were found by mammography 
alone. 
The HIP trial was the first scientific validation of the concept of 
mammographic screening. At this writing it remains the only mam-
mography study of its kind (a randomized controlled trial) ever per-
formed in the United States. It is important to note that the benefits 
of screening were seen only in women fifty to fifty-nine years old. 
No benefit was demonstrated for women sixty to sixty-four or forty 
to forty-nine. These limitations did not dampen the enthusiasm 
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with which the results were greeted when they were presented at the 
American Cancer Society's Second National Conference on Breast 
Cancer in Los Angeles in May 1971.n To the ACS, it was starting to 
feel like Memphis all over again. 
It was sometime shortly thereafter that Philip Strax approached 
ACS Vice President for Medical Affairs Dr. Arthur Holleb with a 
bold vision of an ACS-sponsored nationwide program of free screen-
ing mammography.12 Not needing much convincing, the ACS 
board of directors formally endorsed Strax's vision in February 
1972.13 The Breast Cancer Detection Demonstration Project, in its 
original version, called for the establishment of twelve individual 
detection projects, three in each of the four ACS administrative di-
visions (East, South, Midwest, and West). Each was to enroll ten 
thousand healthy women, aged thirty-five to seventy-four, for free 
annual screening consisting of physical examination, mammog-
raphy, thermography (a technology based on sensing temperature 
differences in various parts of the breast as means of identifying 
cancer),14 and instruction in breast self-examination.15 A budget of 
$2 million was established to fund the program for two years. With 
the recent signing of the National Cancer Act, large sums of fed-
eral funds, designated for cancer control programs, were ready to 
be disbursed. Perceiving an opportunity to do something on a truly 
grand scale, in 1972 the ACS formally proposed to the National 
Cancer Institute that the BCDDP be a jointly sponsored program.16 
The new NCI-ACS demonstration project was to be the first major 
cancer control program in the nation's new War on Cancer.17 Its 
reach was more than doubled, to twenty-seven geographic locations 
(two sites ran two detection projects each, for a total of twenty-nine 
individual projects), and its budget tripled to $6 million, with the 
ACS providing one third and the NCI two thirds. With the dra-
matic increase in the proposed number of centers, the number of 
expected participants grew to 280,000, and the period of screening 
was increased to five years. 
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The decisions to perform a demonstration project, as opposed 
to a true research trial, and to screen women as young as thirty-
five years old have been widely debated in the decades since the 
BCDDP. A demonstration project is typically undertaken once the 
scientific validity of the intervention (here, screening mammogra-
phy) has been firmly established.18 It is done to show how a test 
of proven value may be widely implemented. At the time, the only 
scientific validation of screening mammography was the HIP trial, 
and it had shown benefit only for women in the fifty to fifty-nine 
age group. It is clear that the main goal of the effort was simply to 
demonstrate that mass population screening with mammography 
was feasible and practical.19 It is also clear that some NCI scien-
tists had misgivings about the lack of a scientific orientation to the 
BCDDP.20 Women thirty-five to forty-nine years old were recruited 
for screening despite the absence of evidence that screening would 
benefit them. The sense of the ACS was that if screening worked for 
women fifty to fifty-nine, it would probably work for women of all 
ages, so its use should not be restricted. Recalling the early days of 
the program, Arthur Holleb, chief medical officer of the ACS from 
1968 to 1988, noted in a 1992 article, "The HIP study showed an 
early benefit of screening in women beginning at 50 years of age, 
but the . . . American Cancer Society believed that the BCDDP 
should begin screening at age 35 years of age because more years of 
life might be saved."21 One can only surmise that Philip Strax's own 
experience of losing his wife to breast cancer at such a young age 
helped inform this decision. 
The first three BCDDP centers were designated in January 
1973, and by February 1974, all twenty-seven had been publicly 
announced.22 By the time the first patients were screened in July 
1973, the ACS had already mobilized its vast nationwide army of 
volunteers, numbering 2.5 million at the time.23 This massive effort 
was run out of local ACS chapter offices and involved working with 
women's clubs as well as utilizing radio, television, and newspaper 
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advertising. As with all successful grass-roots campaigns, it was 
the person-to-person contact that proved most effective. Forty-four 
percent of BCDDP participants stated that they had heard about the 
program from a friend, as opposed to 29 percent from the newspa-
per, 11 percent from television, and 9 percent from their physician.24 
By early 1974 there were reports of sites receiving two hundred tele-
phone calls per day from women eager to participate. Nationally, 
appointment wait times grew to between three and six weeks.25 
In the fall of 1974 the BCDDP received an unexpected boost. 
On September 28 President Gerald Ford, at the conclusion of an 
economics conference, announced to the nation that his wife, 
Betty, had been diagnosed with breast cancer and had just under-
gone a radical mastectomy.26 The tumor in Mrs. Ford's right breast 
had been found during a routine medical checkup days before. 
She would later credit early detection for her excellent prognosis. 
Approximately three weeks later, on October 18, Vice President-
designate Nelson Rockefeller disclosed that his forty-eight-year-old 
wife, Margaretta (Happy), had undergone a mastectomy the previ-
ous day.27 Mrs. Rockefeller had identified a lump in her left breast 
on self-examination two weeks earlier. Rockefeller stated that his 
wife's recognition of the lump had been aided by a "heightened 
consciousness" following Mrs. Ford's surgery.28 The lump was con-
firmed by a visit to her gynecologist, who ordered additional testing, 
including a mammogram. 
While neither Betty Ford nor Happy Rockefeller had her breast 
cancer detected by a screening mammogram, the intense media 
attention surrounding their diagnoses caused a surge in inter-
est in mammography. BCDDP centers and non-BCDDP mam-
mography facilities were overwhelmed with women demanding a 
mammogram. This intensified interest extended even beyond the 
usual demographics. College women, on the advice of campus 
health officials, began undergoing screening mammography in large 
numbers.29 
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Significantly aided by this Ford-Rockefeller effect, the BCDDP 
completed the initial round of screening on 270,000 women in the 
first two years of the program.30 As a result of this spike in screening 
rates, there was a 14 percent increase in the incidence of breast cancer 
in the United States during 1974-75. Those were the heady early days 
of mammography. The new screening test had rapidly achieved wide-
spread public acceptance. There was a fresh sense of optimism about 
the potential of modern medical technology to conquer breast can-
cer. Mammography's "new car smell" would not last long, however. 
Already the faint funk of approaching controversy was in the air. 
The Summer of 76 
Two public health issues, swine flu and mammography guidelines, 
dominated the nations attention during the summer of 1976. The 
first involved growing skepticism about a poorly conceived govern-
ment plan to inoculate all Americans against a novel swine flu virus. 
This new virus had caused an outbreak at Fort Dix, New Jersey, 
in February of that year, sickening five hundred and causing one 
death. Fearing a repeat of the 1918-19 worldwide flu pandemic, the 
Ford administration immediately decided to begin development 
and testing of a vaccine against the virus—this even though there 
was no evidence of a developing epidemic in the months following 
the Fort Dix outbreak. The inoculation program eventually ended 
in disaster that fall after deaths and paralytic illnesses were linked 
to the vaccine.31 
The second public health firestorm that summer was one that 
had been smoldering behind the scenes for several months. In Sep-
tember 1975 Dr. John C. Bailar III, NCI deputy associate direc-
tor for cancer control, met with NCI director Dr. Frank Rauscher 
Jr. Bailar, a physician and biostatistician, had become increasingly 
concerned about the risk of radiation-induced breast cancer posed 
by BCDDP mammography, particularly to younger women. He had 
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been making public statements about the issue for several months 
and had already presented the results of his analysis at the May 1975 
meeting of the American Association for Cancer Research. To ad-
dress Bailar's concerns, Rauscher appointed three expert commit-
tees to review the scientific underpinnings of the BCDDR One of 
these, chaired by Dr. Arthur Upton, would study the issue of radia-
tion risk.32 
At this point the controversy was mainly taking place behind 
the scenes, an argument among researchers. There was very little 
public engagement on this issue. Yet the ACS felt that Bailar's as-
sertions were a significant enough threat to the BCDDP that a joint 
press conference with the American College of Radiology was held 
in November 1975 to showcase positive early results from the pro-
gram and to rebut Bailar's criticisms.33 This incident illuminates two 
important dynamics in the evolution of screening mammography. 
First, early on, radiologists and the ACS created a formidable al-
liance in the advocacy and promotion of mammography. In fact, 
radiologists have always had a close relationship with the ACS. Six 
presidents of the ACS have been radiologists, including Dr. Justin 
Stein, whose term (1973-1974) coincided with the launch of the 
BCDDP.34 This alliance has remained strong and has been a reliable 
bulwark through every crisis screening mammography has endured 
to this day. Second, these crises have frequently resulted in a stand-
off between the American College of Radiology and the ACS on the 
one hand and statisticians and epidemiologists on the other, pas-
sionate true believers versus dispassionate truth-seekers. 
Bailar published "Mammography: A Contrary View" in the 
Annals of Internal Medicine in January 1976.35 In it he detailed his 
analysis of the radiation hazards associated with screening mam-
mography. He worked from what was known about breast cancer 
incidence rates in populations of women exposed to high doses of 
radiation, such as atomic bomb survivors, and extrapolated down 
to the lower doses associated with mammography. While Bailar was 
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most concerned about the effects of radiation on younger women, 
whose breasts are more radiation sensitive, he ominously concluded, 
"Regretfully . . . there seems to be a possibility that the routine use 
of mammography in screening asymptomatic women may even-
tually take as many lives as it saves."36 At around the same time, 
consumer activist Ralph Nader's Health Research Group uncovered 
documents showing that seventeen of the fifty-seven BCDDP mam-
mography machines were producing radiation exposures in excess 
of program guidelines. The machine at the Georgetown University 
center in Washington, D.C., was delivering three times the maxi-
mum allowed radiation dose.37 
These revelations and dire forebodings caused quite a stir. In 
March 1976 new BCDDP participant consent forms, for the first 
time describing the risks of radiation, were approved and quickly 
implemented.38 These forms would be revised several more times 
that year, each time to expand on the issue of radiation risk. By 
the time the NCI convened a BCDDP project directors' meeting 
on July 15, 1976, to hear preliminary reports from the three ex-
pert panels, Bailar's warnings had already been widely disseminated 
in the lay press. By August the mounting public criticism of the 
BCDDP had government health officials on the defensive. New 
interim screening guidelines were hastily adopted by the NCI and 
ACS. The new guidelines reported that, on the basis of the work 
of Upton's panel, a single mammogram was believed to increase a 
woman's risk of breast cancer by 1 percent over her lifetime. Citing 
the benefits shown in the HIP study, the guidelines reaffirmed con-
tinued mammographic screening for women over fifty. Regarding 
younger women, however, the guidelines flatly stated, "We cannot 
recommend the routine use of mammography in screening asymp-
tomatic women ages 35-49 years in the NCI/ACS BCDDP."39 
If Betty Ford's and Happy Rockefeller's disclosures were the "ac-
tion" of Newton's third law of motion, John Bailar's assertions were 
the "equal and opposite reaction." Almost immediately, enrollment 
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at BCDDP sites saw a precipitous decline of up to 40 percent.40 The 
possibility of mammography causing cancer prompted women of all 
ages to steer clear of the test. Not only were healthy women avoiding 
screening mammography, but also women with breast lumps who 
needed diagnostic mammography for evaluation of their symptoms 
were refusing the test. 
Almost as soon as the new guidelines were published, it became 
clear that the ACS did not agree with this near-total prohibition on 
screening younger women. ACS officials resorted to an interesting 
tactic of simply defining womanhood between the ages of thirty-five 
and forty-nine as a risky state of being. Both its chief medical officer, 
Dr. Arthur Holleb, and its president, Dr. Benjamin Byrd Jr., were 
repeatedly quoted in lay publications making the dubious argument 
that up to 80 percent of women in that age group are in one or more 
high-risk categories and should be screened.41 In a 1977 Reader's Di-
gest interview, Byrd was asked, "How often should mammograms be 
done?" His response: "Mammograms should be done at the physi-
cian's discretion in women with a higher than normal risk of breast 
cancer. . . . In NCI-ACS experience, about 80% of women 35-50 
meet one or another of these criteria."42 Philip Strax, who ran one 
of the BCDDP sites in New York, promoted his own guidelines. 
Among his reasons for screening younger women was that "women 
who are worried about breast cancer . . . need [mammography] to 
prove they do not have the disease."43 
Undeterred, the NCI tightened the restrictions further in May 
1977, when it issued a modification of the interim guidelines. This 
modification allowed screening mammography in women aged 
thirty-five to forty-nine only if they had a personal history of breast 
cancer or had a mother or sister with the disease. Adherence to the 
new guidelines was made a contractual requirement for sites to con-
tinue participating in the BCDDP.44 
The controversies surrounding the BCDDP led to the conven-
ing of the first National Institutes of Health (NIH) Consensus 
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Development Conference. Known officially as the NIH/NCI 
Consensus Development Meeting on Breast Cancer Screening, it 
was held September 14-16, 1977, and was open to the public. At 
this forum the final reports from the three expert committees es-
tablished in October 1975 were presented. In addition, a fourth 
committee, chaired by Dr. Oliver Beahrs, presented results from a 
detailed review of the BCDDP. The Beahrs Report made several 
important recommendations. First, it recommended continuing 
the BCDDP as a demonstration project, as opposed to trying to 
convert it to a randomized controlled trial, as some had suggested. 
Second, it placed added restrictions on mammographic screening 
in women under fifty. Women between thirty-five and thirty-nine 
should undergo screening only if they had a personal history (not just 
a family history) of breast cancer. It reaffirmed the modified interim 
guidelines that allowed mammography screening for women forty 
to forty-nine who had a personal or a close family history of the 
disease. Third, it recommended that more randomized controlled 
trials, like the HIP, be conducted to find answers to questions that 
the BCDDP would never be able to answer. Questions such as the 
value of screening in women forty to forty-nine years of age and 
the optimum interval between screenings were highlighted.45 The 
recommendations of the Beahrs Report were largely endorsed by 
the conference panelists. Significantly, the age-related mammogra-
phy restrictions remained the official BCDDP policy through the 
remainder of the program. 
Before concluding this chapter, I want briefly to consider one 
more public health issue that had its origin in the summer of 1976. 
This crisis, though, would not come to light until 1981. Epidemiolo-
gists with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control would later trace 
the earliest appearance of the AIDS virus in the United States to a 
small group of individuals, friends and lovers who, in the summer 
of 1976, were living in close proximity to one another in the West 
Village neighborhood of New York City.46 The devastation wrought 
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by this disease would give rise a decade later to the militant AIDS 
activism of the late 1980s, which in turn led to the rise of breast 
cancer activism in the early 1990s. This phenomenon was pivotal in 
the establishment of screening mammography in American culture 
and will be the subject of a later chapter. 
27 
3 
THE AFTERMATH 
Screening in the BCDDP was concluded in 1981, and the first results were published the following year.1 Despite, or pos-sibly because of, the controversy that had ensnared the pro-
gram through much of its course, its sponsors proudly highlighted 
its accomplishments. Just over 280,000 participants had enrolled in 
the program, and about half (51.7 percent) completed all five screen-
ing rounds; 4,443 breast cancers were diagnosed. Of these, 3,557 
diagnoses (80 percent) were directly attributable to screening (mam-
mography or physical examination). The remaining 886 cases came 
to light either between annual screening visits or sometime after the 
participant completed the final round of screening. Of the 3,557 
screening-detected cancers, 41 percent (1,481) were found on mam-
mography alone. In the older HIP study, 33 percent of the screening-
detected cancers were found on mammography alone. Among 
women fifty to fifty-nine years old, 41 percent of cancers in the 
HIP study and 42 percent in the BCDDP were detected by mam-
mography alone. In women forty to forty-nine years old, 19.4 per-
cent of cancers in the HIP were based on mammographic findings 
alone. In the BCDDP, this figure was nearly double, at 35.4 percent. 
THE AFTERMATH 
At surgery, 80 percent of BCDDP screening-detected cancers were 
found to have no involvement of lymph nodes, compared to 70 per-
cent in the HIP. 
Because the BCDDP was not designed as a scientific study, there 
was no control group of women who did not undergo screening. For 
that reason the BCDDP results could shed no light on the question 
of whether or not screening resulted in fewer breast cancer deaths 
(mortality reduction). Yet mortality reduction is the generally ac-
cepted standard by which the efficacy of a screening test is judged. 
If fewer screened than unscreened individuals die of the disease, the 
screening test can be declared effective. 
These limitations notwithstanding, the ACS drew two critical 
conclusions from these early BCDDP data. The first was that the 
mammography of the 1970s was far superior to that of the 1960s. 
The rate of cancer detection in younger women, the percentage of 
cancers detected solely on mammography in women both over fifty 
and under fifty years old, and the rate of lymph node involvement 
were all significantly improved in the BCDDP versus the HIP. Sec-
ond, it was therefore reasoned, since screening with the antiquated 
HIP mammography demonstrated a clear-cut mortality reduction 
for screened women over fifty, one could assume that such a mortal-
ity reduction would accrue to younger women as well with the use 
of modern mammography technology. The fact that the BCDDP's 
design could never positively prove this assumption did not hinder 
its acceptance. 
The BCDDP's Legacy 
In the history of mammography in the United States, the BCDDP 
was a seminal event. What the BCDDP represented, however, was as 
important as what it accomplished. As elegantly described by sociol-
ogist Maren Klawiter, the BCDDP represented a shift of the "mam-
mographic gaze" into asymptomatic populations.2 The shift began 
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